JERUSALEM — Benny Morris, a professor of history in the Middle-East Studies Department at Ben-Gurion University, is something of an enigma. Himself born in Israel in 1948, the year of the re-founding of the country and the resulting war with neighboring Arab states, Morris is the leading figure in the so-called “New Historian” movement in Israel that has been turning the mythologies of the left and right on their political heads. Once a darling of the leftist camp, Morris’ recent works are now largely embraced by the right wing.
The professor’s books are so long — and full of sourced detail — that it is easy for people on any side to cherry-pick a detail or anecdote to prove a point. But the larger picture shows that the truth, as usual, is more complex than the left or right would like to admit.
In “1948: The First Arab-Israeli War,” Morris uses newly-available material from Israeli and Western governments to present almost a day-by-day account of the political negotiations and the Jewish-Arab civil war that occurred before Israel’s declaration of independence as well as the resulting invasion of Israel by many of the surrounding Arab countries and their eventual defeat. (Much of the Arab archives were still secret and unavailable.)
In 420 pages, the reader can see how Middle-Eastern politics often works: future Prime Minister Golda Meir traveling to Jordan disguised in Arab robes to try to persuade the country’s king not to invade Israel; both the Jewish and Arab forces trying to get the British to help them before leaving Palestine; the clandestine efforts of businessmen in the United States and Europe to get weapons to the Jewish army despite a U.S. embargo; and Arab leaders facing enormous public pressure to invade despite their doubts of defeating Israel.
There is something in this book — which is destined to be the definitive work on the 1948 battles for the indefinite future — that will interest and outrage people of all political viewpoints and ideologies. My point here is to provide examples that may shatter the preconceived notions of the left and right.
For the left: The region of Palestine was never considered a “distinct and separate province” by any of his Muslim rulers (except briefly by Saladin, who defeated the Crusaders). It was merely part of a greater section that was administered from Damascus, which would eventually become the capital of Syria:
“[Arabs in Palestine] identified themselves themselves simultaneously as subjects of the (multinational) Ottoman Empire and as part of the (multinational) community of Islam; as Arabs, in terms of geography, culture, and language; as inhabitants of this or that region and village of a vaguely-defined Palestine; and as members of this or that clan or family. There was… not even a hint, in 1881, of a separate Palestinian Arab nationalism.”
There was no such thing as a “Palestinian people” until much, much later.
For the right: The early Zionists bought as much land as possible quarter-acre by quarter-acre from the Ottoman Empire or absentee, Arab landlords — but they never told anyone that their intention was to create a Jewish state. As one settler wrote in regards to the resident Arabs:
“we shall… take away the country… through stratagems [purchasing], without drawing upon us their hostility before we become the strong and populous ones.”
There was never a “land without a people” for a “people without a land,” to quote part of the mythology of Zionism.
For the left: In the first Jewish-Arab civil war that preceded the 1948 pan-Arab invasion, “most [Arabs residents of Palestine who fled parts of what would become Jewish territory] were propelled by fear of being caught up, and harmed, in the fighting; some may have feared life under Jewish rule… the changing economic conditions [for the worse] also contributed.” The Jewish forces did not forcibly expel the Arab population. The Arab leaders tried, usually in vain, to convince Arab males to stay and fight — but many Arabs left voluntarily.
In the latter stage of the civil war, the Jewish military implemented the controversial “Plan D”:
The plan gave [individual] brigades carte blanche to conquer the Arab villages and, in effect, to decide on each village’s fate — destruction or expulsion or occupation… Nowhere does the document speak of a policy or desire to expel “the Arab inhabitants” of Palestine or of any of its constituent regions; nowhere is any brigade instructed to clear out “the Arabs.”
It was never the policy of the Jewish — and, later, Israeli — governments to force the neighboring Arabs out of the soon-to-be-borne state. In actuality, the government hopes that all peoples could live together — as was stated in the State of Israel’s Declaration of Independence and often quoted by Israeli officials.
For the right: The surrounding, Arab countries were not superpower behemoths bent on destroying the tiny, Jewish state and killing all the Jews; in reality, many leaders expressed doubts about invading — and they were led to invade in the end by their religious leaders and the Arab “street,” which wanted to fight in support of their Arab brothers. For example, the king of Jordan only wanted to invade and secure East Jerusalem and the West Bank to enrich his own kingdom; he did not want to risk antagonizing the West by attacking the Jewish part of Palestine. In response, Egypt wanted to expand its lands east and north to balance what the country presumed would be Jordan’s increased territory. The 1948 war was just as much — if not more — about territory than massacring the Jews. Private intentions and public statements to not always match.
Some of the things I learned while reading this book:
- Some Israeli officers were U.S. veterans of World War II.
- Some Jordanian officers were British veterans of World War II.
- Britain supported the Jewish settlers because the Arab population sided with the Ottoman Empire during World War I; Britain toned down the support during World War II to pacify the Arabs and allow the country to use Palestine as a base of operations against Italy. This led to deep, Jewish distrust of the British. Still, most Arabs in Palestine wanted the Axis powers to win.
- During the British Mandate, Britain trained and equipped the Jewish settlers, many of whom fought in World War II. A few years later, the settlers used the knowledge against the Arabs and, in some cases, to attack the British.
- President Franklin Roosevelt would not officially support the Jewish settlers because he wanted friendship — and oil — from the king of Saudi Arabia. Later, Jewish lobbying efforts — as well as an American people who were just learning about the Holocaust — persuaded President Truman to recognize the State of Israel.
- At the famous Yalta conference during World War II, both Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin told each other that they were Zionists.
- In 1940, a fringe group of Jewish fighters tried to enlist Nazi Germany’s aid against the British in Palestine; Germany declined.
- Jewish forces likely committed more wartime atrocities against Arabs than vice-versa.
- Jerusalem was war-torn as a result of Jewish-Arab fighting as well as fighting between Christian and Muslim Arabs.
- The Arab armies usually had more-advanced weaponry, but the Israeli military had more manpower as well as greater command-and-control in their own territory.
These are just a few of my notes from this dense, intriguing book. I would go further, but I would just invite you to read for yourself. This is one of the best books on Middle East history I have read.
