understanding politics, considerations

Voting Rights, Election Ballot, and Voting Statistics in Israel


March 3rd, 2009 · Israel and the Middle East, Law and Legal Affairs, Religion, World Affairs

israeli elections, election israel, election in israel, israeli elections 2009, voting rights, israeli election 2009, israel elections, elections in israel, israeli election results, election ballot, voting statisticsEleventh in an ongo­ing series

RISHON LEZION, Israel — Imag­ine that you enter a vot­ing booth in the United States to choose your con­gress­man, and there is only one choice on the bal­lot: “The Demo­c­ra­tic Party” or “The Repub­li­can Party.” This is the only option that Israelis have at elec­tion time.

As Israeli vot­ers pon­der the fate of their coun­try fol­low­ing its recent, incon­clu­sive elec­tions, the Jew­ish state itself is fac­ing a cri­sis of con­fi­dence. The peo­ple dis­trust their lead­ers fol­low­ing numer­ous inves­ti­ga­tions, con­vic­tions, and res­ig­na­tions from the top lev­els of gov­ern­ment for seri­ous crimes (includ­ing a for­mer pres­i­dent Moshe Katsav’s future trial for rape and sex­ual harass­ment) and bla­tant inep­ti­tude (the failed war against Hizbol­lah in 2006). Civil soci­ety is becom­ing frac­tured and polar­ized because of polit­i­cal, eth­nic, and reli­gious divi­sions. The chance of peace with the Pales­tini­ans is look­ing increas­ingly remote with each pass­ing year.

All of these prob­lems have com­plex causes, but there is one under­ly­ing fac­tor that is a par­tially respon­si­ble for each of them: Israel’s bro­ken elec­toral sys­tem. If Israel wants to solve these fun­da­men­tal issues, then the gov­ern­ment must replace its proportional-representation elec­toral process with one that resem­bles the Amer­i­can model: a rep­re­sen­ta­tive democ­racy that uses a winner-take-all system.

When a coun­try decides upon an elec­toral sys­tem, it must choose between two types that have con­flict­ing values.

Pro­por­tional rep­re­sen­ta­tion, the sys­tem used here, gives a polit­i­cal party a num­ber of seats in the leg­is­la­ture that is equiv­a­lent to its level of sup­port in an elec­tion. If the center-right Likud Party in Israel, for exam­ple, receives twenty-five per­cent of the over­all vote in an elec­tion, it would have roughly the same per­cent­age of seats in the next parliament.

How­ever, a rep­re­sen­ta­tive democ­racy divides a coun­try into elec­toral dis­tricts, and the can­di­date who receives the most votes in a dis­trict becomes the rep­re­sen­ta­tive of that area in the leg­is­la­ture. This is the model for U.S. elections.

Each sys­tem has its ben­e­fits and draw­backs. Pro­por­tional rep­re­sen­ta­tion ensures that nearly all opin­ions have at least some pres­ence in gov­ern­ment. This allows for a diver­sity of view­points, and it ensures that minor­ity voices and var­i­ous inter­ests have polit­i­cal voices. In Israel, this results in a polit­i­cal party for Arab cit­i­zens hav­ing rep­re­sen­ta­tion in the leg­is­la­ture of a Jew­ish state, and it allowed for a small interest-group like the Gil party here to gain enough influ­ence in the 2006 elec­tion to advo­cate for pen­sion­ers in the result­ing par­lia­ment. How­ever, Israeli gov­ern­ments elected through this sys­tem are always unsta­ble because a sin­gle party never gains enough leg­isla­tive seats in such a frac­tured coun­try to claim majority-control of the Knes­set, Israel’s parliament, by itself. This forces the major par­ties to gain a major­ity of seats by form­ing coali­tions with minor and extreme polit­i­cal par­ties, which then gain a dis­pro­por­tion­ate amount of influ­ence and an abil­ity to extort through a veto pen.

In con­trast, rep­re­sen­ta­tive sys­tems usu­ally result in polit­i­cal mod­er­a­tion and inter­nal sta­bil­ity because of sta­tis­tics. The dis­tri­b­u­tion of polit­i­cal beliefs of any given pop­u­la­tion usu­ally resem­bles the shape of a bell curve: There are a large num­ber of peo­ple in the mid­dle, but the level of sup­port declines swiftly as one moves fur­ther left and right. When the size of a sam­ple pop­u­la­tion increases, so does the over­all ten­dency towards mod­er­a­tion. As a result, the can­di­dates who receive the high­est num­ber of votes in most leg­isla­tive dis­tricts will usu­ally be mod­er­ates from the center-left or center-right par­ties. In the United States, for exam­ple, nearly every con­gress­man is a Demo­c­rat or Repub­li­can. How­ever, the neg­a­tive con­se­quence is that these par­ties hold a monop­oly on power. Other view­points are rarely heard.

Israel’s proportional-representation sys­tem – in which the peo­ple lit­er­ally vote for a party in Knes­set elec­tions — does result in the pres­ence of var­i­ous opin­ions in the leg­is­la­ture, but the trade­off is that gov­ern­ments can be weak, inef­fec­tual, and par­a­lyzed. To solve the com­plex issues that are fac­ing the coun­try, Israel needs to value polit­i­cal mod­er­a­tion and sta­bil­ity over ensur­ing that a diver­sity of opin­ions is involved in pub­lic pol­icy. It needs to divide the coun­try into leg­isla­tive dis­tricts and imple­ment a winner-take-all sys­tem in which each party, fol­low­ing a pri­mary, runs one can­di­date in each local­ity. The ben­e­fits would be numerous.

Func­tion­ing gov­ern­ments. Small and extrem­ist par­ties would receive fewer seats, if any, in the Knes­set while the center-left Labor, mod­er­ate Kadima, and center-right Likud would receive many more. The cen­ter would become stronger, and the extremes would lose power because a sin­gle party would be more likely to gain a major­ity in the Knes­set by itself (or with one other party at most). Gov­ern­ments would sur­vive until the next sched­uled elec­tion because they would never be held hostage by smaller par­ties that have dis­pro­por­tion­ate influ­ence in gov­ern­ing coali­tions. Minor par­ties would not have the abil­ity to veto the peace process — or other major issues — by top­pling the gov­ern­ment. The ultra-Orthodox Shas party, for exam­ple, would not be able to demand — and receive — NIS 775 mil­lion ($224 mil­lion) from the gov­ern­ment for its reli­gious insti­tu­tions, as it did last year. (Pork-barrel pol­i­tics, it seems, can still occur in a Jew­ish state.)

National con­sen­sus. Israeli pol­icy would gen­er­ally remain con­sis­tent over time because gov­ern­ments and min­istries would be com­prised of peo­ple who range only from the center-left to the center-right. The Israeli gov­ern­ment and peo­ple would be able to form broad, mod­er­ate com­pro­mises on the unad­dressed polit­i­cal and reli­gious issues that have plagued Israeli soci­ety for decades: the con­flict­ing desires to have a coun­try that is a Jew­ish state, a democ­racy, and in the ancient Land of Israel; the issues of Jew­ish iden­tity and diver­sity within the Jew­ish reli­gion; and the long­stand­ing con­flict with the Palestinians.

Many efforts to resolve these issues are vetoed by extrem­ist par­ties whom gov­ern­ments need to please to keep them in gov­ern­ing coali­tions to remain in power. So far, Israel has cho­sen to sweep these long­stand­ing con­tro­ver­sies under the prover­bial rug in an effort to pro­long the unsus­tain­able sta­tus quo as long as pos­si­ble. But it is time to set­tle them once and for all.

Faith in gov­ern­ment. Israelis vote in every elec­tion, but they have no one in the Knes­set who directly rep­re­sents them because party offi­cials usu­ally com­pile their own lists of can­di­dates for the Knes­set. If Likud, for example, wins enough votes to receive thirty seats, then the top thirty peo­ple on the party’s list will become mem­bers of the Knesset.

If indi­vid­ual mem­bers of the Knes­set were cho­sen directly by the peo­ple rather than polit­i­cal par­ties, then Israelis would have more con­fi­dence in their lead­ers. The fact that party offi­cials cre­ate can­di­date lists only invites cor­rup­tion at every level. A mem­ber of the Knes­set would be less likely to engage in unfit prac­tices if the peo­ple had the direct abil­ity to remove him from office at the next elec­tion. The qual­ity of the mem­bers of the Knes­set would increase when the peo­ple have the abil­ity to eval­u­ate a candidate’s ideas, qual­i­fi­ca­tions, and integrity before choos­ing whether to vote for him.

More­over, an elec­toral sys­tem in which peo­ple vote for par­ties and ide­olo­gies — as opposed to vot­ing for a per­son — encour­ages par­ti­san­ship and extrem­ism in general.

Still, a rep­re­sen­ta­tive democ­racy in Israel would be far from per­fect. In recent years, the Democ­rats and Repub­li­cans in var­i­ous U.S. states have redrawn leg­isla­tive dis­tricts in an effort to ensure that rep­re­sen­ta­tives from their par­ties are con­sis­tently re-elected. To avoid such a sce­nario in Israel, the power to deter­mine the elec­toral bound­aries should be given not to the Knes­set but to a multi-party com­mit­tee appointed by the pres­i­dent and com­prised of esteemed, retired statesmen.

There may be another sig­nif­i­cant issue. If minor and extreme par­ties are mar­gin­al­ized, then it would be likely that non-Jews — most sig­nif­i­cantly Israeli Arabs — would lose their rep­re­sen­ta­tion because they com­prise a plu­ral­ity in few, if any, places. Those who are extremely pas­sion­ate about one issue, like Gil’s pen­sion­ers, would also lose their abil­ity to advance their cause by form­ing a polit­i­cal party and gain­ing a few Knes­set seats.

How­ever, these prob­lems would prob­a­bly be less sig­nif­i­cant than one would think. In an effort to attract addi­tional vot­ers, the remain­ing two or three major par­ties would even­tu­ally co-opt the polit­i­cal causes (like advo­cat­ing for pen­sion­ers) and eth­nic con­stituen­cies (like Russ­ian immi­grants) that had been rep­re­sented by var­i­ous minor par­ties. (This is sim­i­lar to what hap­pens in the United States: either the Democ­rats or the Repub­li­cans will neu­tral­ize a third party by adopt­ing its cause.) In addi­tion, the elec­toral com­mit­tee could draw the elec­toral map in a man­ner that unites Israeli Arabs, or any other demo­graphic group, in an given area into a sin­gle leg­isla­tive dis­trict to ensure that they have rep­re­sen­ta­tion. The ben­e­fits of a rep­re­sen­ta­tive democ­racy would far out­weigh any pos­si­ble drawbacks.

Imple­ment­ing such a rad­i­cal change in Israel’s elec­toral sys­tem would not be easy. Of course, the minor polit­i­cal par­ties would resist any reforms that would decrease their power. All of the polit­i­cal par­ties will fight against any changes that reduce their abil­ity to pick the indi­vid­ual mem­bers of the Knes­set them­selves, but they should dis­miss these self­ish con­cerns for the sake of the country.

How­ever, there is a way to adopt these needed reforms. Pres­i­dent Shi­mon Peres could lead the way. As Israel’s head of state, he is sup­posed to rise above pol­i­tics and rep­re­sent the Israeli peo­ple as a whole. In this capac­ity, Peres can work to per­suade the Knes­set. The lead­ers of Labor, Kadima, and Likud could sup­port this effort as well. The three major par­ties would nat­u­rally ben­e­fit from these reforms, and they would be able gather enough votes to pass this legislation. Although elec­toral reform seems to be dead in the next gov­ern­ment already, this issue can­not be taken off the table.

After sixty years as the Mid­dle East’s only democ­racy, it is time for Israel to reform its elec­toral sys­tem before the next elec­tion and unite its peo­ple under a ban­ner of mod­er­a­tion, sta­bil­ity, and unity. This might be the only way for the Jew­ish state to sur­vive for another sixty years.

Prior let­ter: Sex and Fem­i­nism in Israel

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